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A FUNDAMENTAL FLAW WITH UNCITRAL'S APPROACH TO CROSS-
BORDER SECURED TRANSACTIONS: THE FAILURE TO ADDRESS
CREDITOR DUE DILIGENCE ISSUES
JOHN J. CHUNG*
INTRODUCTION
Developed economies recognize the need for the use of collateral to reduce the
risk of non-payment of loans. A security interest in collateral provides the secured
lender with a source of repayment beyond the borrower's mere promise to repay.
Unlike an unsecured loan in which the obligation to repay is supported by only the
borrower's promise, a secured loan is supported by the borrower's promise plus
collateral. Thus, a secured loan reduces the risk of non-payment to the lender. This
paper will focus on security interests in collateral in the form of personal property.
In the United States, such security interests are governed by Article 9 of the UCC. 2
The development of Article 9 in the 1950's addressed the problems faced by
commercial businesses and lawyers in dealing with the differing laws of 50 states.
Visiting Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law (Spring 2012); Associate Professor, Roger
Williams University School of Law; B.A., Washington University (St. Louis); J.D., Harvard Law School.
1 The definition of "security interest" in the Uniform Commercial Code (sometimes referred to as the
"UCC" or the "Code") is found in Article 1 of the Code at U.C.C. § 1-201(a)(35), which provides in
pertinent part: 'Security interest' means an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment
or performance of an obligation." U.C.C. § 1-201(a)(35) (2011). Unless otherwise indicated, all citations to
the Code in this paper are to the 2011 version of the UCC found in Selected Commercial Statutes (Carol L.
Chomsky et al. eds., West 2011).
"A security interest, of course, gives the secured creditor higher priority in reaching those assets to satisfy
the debt than would be the case if the creditor simply were entitled to share the assets with all of the debtor's
creditors." With this "first shot" at the assets of the debtor, it becomes possible for the debt to be paid in full,
even if the debtor becomes insolvent. The grant of a security interest decreases the creditor's risk of loss and,
accordingly, allows the creditor to enter into the credit transaction at an interest rate low enough for the
transaction to be profitable to the debtor. Thus, by reducing the insolvency risk, the security interest
facilitates the transaction." Neil B. Cohen, Harmonizing the Law Governing Secured Credit: The Next
Frontier, 33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 173, 176 (1998).
To provide a simple illustration, suppose a consumer purchases an automobile with a loan from a bank. As
any consumer knows, the automobile will be collateral for the loan. Suppose the purchaser loses her job and
is unable to pay any of her debts. Because the bank has a security interest in the automobile, it has the right
to take possession of the car, sell it, and apply the proceeds of the sale to its loan. Thus, the bank may be
repaid even if all the consumer's other debts remain unpaid.
2 Section 9-109(a) of the Code provides in pertinent part: "[T]his article applies to: (1) a transaction,
regardless of its form, that creates a security interest in personal property or fixtures by contract." U.C.C. §
9-109(a). Comment 1 to section 9-101 provides in pertinent part: "[Article 9] provides a comprehensive
scheme for the regulation of security interests in personal property and fixtures." Id. at § 9-101 cmt. 1.
The definition of "security interest" in section 1-201(b)(35) is incorporated in Article 9. See id. at § 9-102
cmt. 1 ("Note that the definition of 'security interest' is found in Section 1-201, not in this Article, and has
been revised.").
Article 9 contains the definitions of "security agreement" and "secured party." A "security agreement" is
"an agreement that creates or provides for a security interest." Id. at § 9-102(a)(73). A "secured party"
includes "a person in whose favor a security interest is created or provided for under a security agreement ..
."Idat §9-102(a)(72).
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The UCC solved a massive transaction cost problem by unifying 50 laws into one
uniform code, and no doubt played a material role in the post-World War II
prosperity in the U.S.
Seeking to emulate the success of Article 9, various international organizations
have attempted to develop a harmonized or more uniform approach to international
secured transactions. One such organization is the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL").3 UNCITRAL has developed a Legislative
Guide on Secured Transactions (the "Legislative Guide").4  According to the
Legislative Guide, its objectives are:
3 UNCITRAL describes itself this way:
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL),
established by the United Nations General Assembly by its resolution 2205 (XXI) of 17
December 1966 (see annex I), plays an important role in developing that framework in
pursuance of its mandate to further the progressive harmonization and modernization of
the law of international trade by preparing and promoting the use and adoption of
legislative and non-legislative instruments in a number of key areas of commercial law.
Those areas include dispute resolution, international contract practices, transport,
insolvency, electronic commerce, international payments, secured transactions,
procurement and sale of goods. These instruments are negotiated through an
international process involving a variety of participants, including member States of
UNCITRAL, which represent different legal traditions and levels of economic
development; non-member States; intergovernmental organizations; and non-
governmental organizations. Thus, these texts are widely acceptable as offering
solutions appropriate to different legal traditions and to countries at different stages of
economic development. In the years since its establishment, UNCITRAL has been
recognized as the core legal body of the United Nations system in the field of
international trade law.
U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, The UNCITRAL Guide, Basic facts about the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law 1 (2010), available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/general/06-50941_Ebook.pdf.
4 U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions, (2010) (the
"Legislative Guide"), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/security-lg/e/09-82670_Ebook-
Guide_09-04-10English.pdf. The Legislative Guide is intended to apply to secured transactions in the form
of "contractually created rights in moveable assets that secure the payment or other performance of an
obligation." Id. at 61.
According to one supporter of the Legislative Guide:
The Guide follows a modem approach to secured transactions that can be described as
an integrated and functional approach, relying on a public registry that provides notice
to third parties and is reflected in several national and international texts on security
interests in movable assets. In this way, the Guide becomes the basic text to be referred
to in the modernization and harmonization efforts relating to secured transactions law.
Spiros V. Bazinas, The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions-Key Objectives and
Fundamental Policies, 42 #2 UCC L.J. 123, 126-127 (2010).
In addition, it was decided that the Working Group would not examine a number of
legislative policies that States might enact to limit the availability of consensual secured
credit in the name of social solidarity or other public policies. The operating
assumption of the Guide is that these are all decisions States might take, but that
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(a) To promote low-cost credit by enhancing the availability of
secured credit;
(b) To allow debtors to use the full value inherent in their assets to
support credit;
(c) To enable parties to obtain security rights in a simple and
efficient manner;
(d) To provide for equal treatment of diverse sources of credit and
of diverse forms of secured transactions;
(e) To validate non-possessory security rights in all types of assets;
(f) To enhance certainty and transparency by providing for
registration of a notice of a security right in a general security rights
registry;
(g) To establish clear and predictable priority rules;
(h) To facilitate efficient enforcement of a secured creditor's rights;
(i) To allow parties maximum flexibility to negotiate the terms of
their security agreement;
(j) To balance the interests of all persons affected by a secured
transaction; and
(k) To harmonize secured transactions laws, including conflict-of-
laws rules relating to secured transactions.
exactly how would be driven by very specific considerations of national policy. The
foundational purpose of the Guide is to make recommendations to States about how to
achieve an efficient, effective and internally equitable regime of consensual secured
transactions. The various key objectives of the Guide are, consequently, cast with this
overarching goal in mind.
Id. at 134.
Legislative Guide, supra note 4, at 462.
UNCITRAL generates four types of work product: (1) Conventions; (2) Model Laws; (3) Legislative
Guides; and (4) Model Rules. See Edward S. Cohen, Normative Modeling for Global Economic
Governance: The Case of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), 36
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 567, 578-579 (2011). Legislative Guides are designed to:
[A]id states in the development or reform of a particular area of commercial law. These
are less specific and structured than Model Laws; they are developed either to aid in the
interpretation of a model law or to address an area where it proves too difficult to
resolve the distinction between national legal systems into a common structure. In
addition, Legislative Guides are at times used by other international and regional
institutions (especially lending banks and agencies) as part of the conditions for aid to
specific states.
Id. at 579.
The final procedural stage behind the development of the Legislative Guide is as follows:
At its thirty-ninth session, in 2006, the Commission considered and approved in
principle the substance of the recommendations of the Guide. The final negotiations
were held during the fortieth session of UNCITRAL, held in Vienna from 25 June to 12
July 2007 (first part), and from 10 to 14 December 2007 (second part), and the Guide
2012] 559
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Commentators have offered numerous reasons to justify this international attempt to
harmonize secured transactions laws. They include: (1) the uncertainty and
transactions costs imposed on lenders in determining and attempting to comply with
differing and conflicting laws; (2) the inability of some national regimes to deal
with international transactions; (3) the need to modernize and facilitate international
commerce; (4) the need to reduce transaction costs and risks created by non-
uniform laws; and (5) providing a neutral choice of law.6 As summarized by one
commentator:
The differences between secured credit regimes, in terms of both
substantive principles and their procedural effectuation, create
uncertainty and transaction costs that lower the expected value of a
transaction to the creditor. Once again, these differences likely
result in higher interest rates and, in some cases, foregone
transactions.7
Such goals have driven attempts such as the Legislative Guide to harmonize secured
transactions laws across national borders.
The asserted need for harmonization has been underscored by the disparities in
national laws.
First, there are wide differences in philosophy and legal culture
concerning the extent to which security should be recognized at all
and the conditions necessary for the validity of a security interest.
was adopted by consensus on 14 December 2007. Subsequently, the General Assembly
adopted resolution 63/121 of 11 December 2008. In this resolution, the General
Assembly expressed its appreciation to UNCITRAL for the completion and adoption of
the Guide, requested the Secretary-General to broadly disseminate the Guide, and
recommended to States both the Guide and the United Nations Convention on the
Assignment of Receivables in International Trade (the "Receivables Convention"), the
principles of which are also reflected in the Guide.
See Bazinas, supra note 4, at 133-34 (footnotes omitted).
6 See Sandeep Gopalan, The Creation ofInternational Commercial Law: Sovereignty Felled, 5 SAN DIEGO
INT'L L.J. 267, 278-89 (2004).
7 Cohen, supra note 1, at 176. In another article, Professor Cohen specified four concerns:
(1) [I]n an international transaction, there is substantial uncertainty as to which
jurisdiction's law will govern various aspects of a secured transaction; (2) the cost of
acquiring knowledge of the laws of the jurisdiction that will govern the transaction can
often be high; (3) the jurisdiction that will govern the transaction may have laws that
are uncertain, adding an element of risk to the transaction; and (4) the governing
jurisdiction may have laws that do not effectively promote secured credit.
Neil B. Cohen, Internationalizing the Law of Secured Credit: Perspectives from the U.S. Experience, 20 U.
PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 423, 432 (1999) (footnote omitted).
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Common law jurisdictions, which are generally sympathetic to the
concepts of party autonomy and self-help, have a liberal attitude
towards security. This attitude allows security interests to be taken
with a minimum of formality over both present and future assets to
secure existing and future indebtedness. In addition, they allow
universal security rather than require specific security. By contrast,
civil law jurisdictions have been more cautious in their approach to
nonpossessory security and have been anxious about the 'false
wealth' which such practices are perceived as permitting. So in
these jurisdictions, one finds, in varying degrees, requirements of
specificity or individualization of collateral, the need for a new
post-acquisition act of transfer to give in rem effects to security in
after-acquired property, requirements of notice to the debtor as a
condition of the validity (not merely priority) of an assignment of
debts, and restrictions on self-help remedies such as possession and
sale of the collateral.8
Proponents of international harmonization have admired America's experience
with the UCC and have drawn explicit parallels between the current state of
commercial law in the international realm to America's situation before the
development of the Uniform Commercial Code. 9 The varying laws of the individual
American states governed secured transactions and subjected lenders to the risk of
non-uniform laws. The lack of uniformity posed obstacles to national commerce.
Article 9 addressed and solved these problems and has established itself as an
unqualified success.' 0 For this reason, international lawyers have looked to Article 9
for guidance and inspiration in their attempts to achieve similar results on a global
scale, and the Legislative Guide was heavily influenced by Article 9."
Roy Goode, Security in Cross-Border Transactions, 33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 47, 48 (1998).
A possessory security interest is one in which the creditor maintains possession of the collateral. A non-
possessory security interest is one in which the borrower maintains possession. Thus, the security interest in
an automobile is a non-possessory security interest.
9 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 7, at 435.
10 Indeed, Article 9 has been described as the "jewel" of the Uniform Commercial Code. Donald J.
Rapson, Default and Enforcement of Security Interests under Revised Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 893,
893 (1999). The original enacted version of Article 9 was largely the product of Professor Grant Gilmore's
draftsmanship. See GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY x-xi (1965)
(discussing Professor Gilmore's involvement in drafting Article 9).
A large part of Article 9's success is undoubtedly due, in large part, to the fact that it is comprehensive.
Gilmore described it as "all-embracing, all-devouring; it covers everything." Id. at 295. This paper explains
how lender due diligence is included in Article 9's comprehensive scope.
1 "The [Legislative] Guide recommends a functional approach to secured transactions, which was
originally taken in Article 9 of the American Uniform Commercial Code." Bazinas, supra note 4, at 128.
A Canadian commentator also noted the heavy influence of Article 9 on the drafting of the Legislative
Guide.
In fact, however, the Guide by and large adopted the basic principles of modernization
instantiated by Article 9: (a) a unitary, functional approach to scope; (b) nonpossessory
2012] 561
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The original version of Article 9 was largely drafted in the 1950's and resulted
in the Official Text of 1966.12 By 1968, it had been enacted in all states, except for
Louisiana (which adopted it later).' 3 An entirely new version of Article 9 was
promulgated in 1998, and by July 1, 2001, all of the states had adopted the revised
Article 9 (although four states delayed its effective date).14
The proponents of international efforts such as the Legislative Guide find
encouragement in America's adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, and view
their efforts as the initial steps to accomplishing the global equivalent of a uniform
security over present and future property; (c) an extended concept of proceeds; (d) a
notice-filing registry system; (e) non-judicial enforcement; (f) equal protection for
acquisition financing whether offered by sellers or lenders; and (g) special rules
governing third-party effectiveness, priority, and enforcement of certain intangible
assets, including receivables, bank accounts, independent guarantees, negotiable
instruments, and negotiable documents.
Roderick A. Macdonald, Three Metaphors of Norm Migration in International Context, 34 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 603, 641 (2009) (footnote omitted).
12 See JAIES BROOK, PROBLEMS AND CASES ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS 18 (2008) (noting drafting and
redrafting occurred predominately in 1950s).
13 See id.
14 See id. Revised Article 9 became effective simultaneously on 1 July 2001 in forty-six states, and since 1
January 2002, has been in effect in all states.
This is remarkable in at least three respects: (1) Article 9 has been enacted with almost
perfect uniformity (such local tinkering as has occurred has been minor and at the
margins, generally adding some narrow exclusions from the scope of Article 9's
coverage); thus, national uniformity has essentially been achieved despite this body of
law being enacted by the states rather than by Congress; (2) in the past, several years
passed before all the states had enacted the various revised articles or other uniform
laws, while in this case, the entire enactment process has been accomplished within
three legislative sessions; and (3) an agreed deferred uniform effective date has been
successfully used for the first time in the history of uniform laws in the US, thereby
dramatically lessening the cost of change in the law.
Harry Sigman, Security in Movables in the United States - Uniform Commercial Code Article 9: a basis for
comparison, in SECURITY RIGHTS IN MOVABLE PROPERTY IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 54, 63 (Eva-Maria
Kieninger ed., 2004).
Comment 1 of section 9-101 explains the relationship between the revised Article 9 and former Article 9.
This Article supersedes former Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Article 9. As did its
predecessor, it provides a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of security interests
in personal property and fixtures. For the most part this Article follows the general
approach and retains much of the terminology of former Article 9. In addition to
describing many aspects of the operation and interpretation of this Article, these
Comments explain the material changes that this Article makes to former Article 9.
Former Article 9 superseded the wide variety of pre-UCC security devices. Unlike the
Comments to former Article 9, however, these Comments dwell very little on the pre-
UCC state of the law. For that reason, the Comments to former Article 9 will remain of
substantial historical value and interest. They also will remain useful in understanding
the background and general conceptual approach of this Article.
U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. 1 (2011).
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code." The thesis of this paper, however, is that efforts such as the Legislative
Guide lack a crucial feature of the Uniform Commercial Code. This paper contends
that the success of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial is the result, in large part,
of its role in guiding the due diligence efforts of lenders in determining whether to
make a loan or not. In effect, Article 9 says to lenders: If you conduct due
diligence, as guided by Article 9, you will have assurance that you have a valid
security interest with the priority you seek. The Legislative Guide does little, if
anything, to address due diligence issues. Because it does not do so, it cannot have
the force and vitality of Article 9. For this reason, this paper contends that the
Legislative Guide is a pale imitation, at best, of Article 9, and cannot achieve what
Article 9 has achieved. This paper further questions whether the Legislative Guide
is necessary at all, because the international capital markets have devised powerful
means to enable banks to engage in cross-border secured lending without the need
for such empty efforts as the Legislative Guide.
Part I of this paper addresses how Article 9 is, in effect, a "how to" guide for
lenders to conduct their due diligence before making a loan. It also discusses the
history of the Uniform Commercial Code to explain how "due diligence"
requirements became embedded in the Code. The fact that lenders' due diligence
practices are inseparable from the function and requirements of Article 9 is not an
accident; it was part of the original design. Part II of this paper provides several
illustrations of how particular sections of Article 9 guide due diligence, and
demonstrates that any secured lender operating under Article 9 must necessarily
comply with the due diligence procedures in order to receive full protection. Part
III explains how the Legislative Guide is fundamentally flawed because it does not
provide guidance on how to perform due diligence. Unlike Article 9, the
Legislative Guide does not reflect or embody how actual lenders conduct their due
diligence. Indeed, it does not address the matter in any obvious way, and that is
why it has little use. Part IV examines the explosive growth of multi-bank lending
across borders, which has enabled borrowers and lenders in different countries to
enter into loan transactions, all without the need for anything like the Legislative
Guide. The banking world has not stood still waiting for technocrats to devise
impotent guides to encourage lending. The banking world has moved forward and
continues to move forward to make secured credit globally available. All of this
has occurred without the assistance of the Legislative Guide or any other, similar
effort. Thus, this raises the issue as to whether the Legislative Guide serves any
material purpose. Part V concludes this paper.
15 Cf Bazinas, supra note 4 ("The [Legislative] Guide recommends a functional approach to secured
transactions, which was originally taken in Article 9 of the American Uniform Commercial Code") (footnote
omitted).
2012] 563
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I. ARTICLE 9 AS A "How To" GUIDE ON LENDER DUE DILIGENCE
Loans may be divided into two categories: unsecured and secured. With
unsecured loans, lenders loan money in exchange for the borrower's mere promise
to repay. With secured loans, lenders loan money in exchange for the borrower's
promise plus a security interest in certain collateral.' 6 Generally, any kind of
property may be used as collateral. Real property, whether residential or
commercial, is a common type of collateral. Personal property, whether tangible or
intangible, is also a common type of collateral. The creation of a security interest in
personal property is governed by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.'
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code has been a great success in
facilitating the loan process.' 8 A major reason for its success is that it tells lenders
how to perform their due diligence before making a secured loan.19 Before making
any loan, a lender must ask itself, among other things, "will I be repaid?" and "what
16 The legal framework for governing secured transactions must contain the following elements.
To support secured credit effectively, a legal regime must address three distinct
issues. First, the regime must determine how a debtor and creditor may create inter se
an enforceable agreement that certain property of the debtor will serve as collateral for
the debtor's obligation. Not only must the necessity of such formalities as signed
writings be addressed, but also such issues as the ability of debtors to encumber
disparate items of property in a single grant of a security interest and the ability to
encumber anticipatorily property not yet owned by the debtor.
Second, a secured credit regime must set out the ground rules for enforcement of the
secured party's interest after default by the debtor. For example, how may the secured
party obtain physical possession of the collateral (if it is tangible) or control of the
collateral (if it is not tangible)? May self-help be utilized, or must the secured party
resort to the courts? What limits exist on the methods by which the secured party
reduces the collateral to money and applies that money to the debtor's obligation?
Third, and perhaps most important, a secured credit regime must delineate the rights
of the secured party as against other claimants of the collateral. A security interest that
is enforceable against the debtor, but is subordinate to the rights of another secured
creditor or of a lien creditor, has much less economic value than an interest that is
superior to those competing rights. Both moral and economic value judgments are
required to determine the rules that establish priority among competing claimants.
Cohen, supra note 7, at 430-31 (footnotes omitted).
17 U.C.C. § 9-109(a); see id. at § 9-101 cmt. 1.
18 See Rapson, supra note 10, at 893 ("Article 9 has been rightfully lauded as the 'jewel' of the Uniform
Commercial Code").
19 The U.C.C. defines due diligence outside of Article 9:
An organization exercises due diligence if it maintains reasonable routines for
communicating significant information to the person conducting the transaction and
there is reasonable compliance with the routines. Due diligence does not require an
individual acting for the organization to communicate information unless the
communication is part of the individual's regular duties or the individual has reason to
know of the transaction, and that the transaction would be materially affected by the
information.
U.C.C. § 1-202(f).
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is the risk the loan will not be repaid?" The process by which the lender determines
the answer to such questions is called "due diligence."20 All lenders must perform
due diligence with respect to the borrower himself, herself, or itself. Basically, the
lender must determine if the borrower is willing and able to repay the loan. Some
borrowers seek loans on a fraudulent basis and have no willingness to repay. Other
borrowers have the best intentions to repay but are unable to do so. That is why the
borrower must be willing and able. 2 1 For unsecured lenders, the due diligence
process usually ends here.
For secured lenders, though, the due diligence process continues. The secured
lender must conduct due diligence into the collateral that has been offered to
support the loan. In order to conduct due diligence regarding the collateral, the
secured lender must ask (at a minimum) the following series of questions: (1) Does
the collateral exist? Fraudulent borrowers have been known to offer collateral that
does not exist.22 (2) Does the borrower have the right to grant a security interest in
the collateral? Fraudulent borrowers have been known to offer a security interest in
property they do not own.23 (3) Does the value of the collateral support the loan
amount? No lender wants to loan $1 million in exchange for a security interest in
collateral that is only worth $100.24 (4) Is the collateral encumbered by any liens or
liabilities? A lender needs to know if any other party has a right to the collateral. 25
In the U.S., one of the essential requirements of creditor due diligence is that the
creditor check the U.C.C. filings of the appropriate state to determine if there is a
prior security interest.26
20 See Pauline Stevens, The Intersection of Film Finance and Revised Article 9: A Mystery, 9 UCLA ENT.
L. REv. 211, 219 (2002) (discussing how due diligence under U.C.C. Article 9 involves locating collateral
and determining priority of interests through searching records in offices where security interests are filed).
21 See Marshall E. Tracht, Renegotiation and Secured Credit: Explaining the Equity of Redemption, 52
VAND. L. REv. 599, 622 (1999) (explaining lenders' insistence on protecting their interests).
22 Cf Bank of Saipan v. CNG Fin. Corp., 380 F.3d 836, 844 n. 7 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting there was no fraud
since fictitious credit card accounts proposed as collateral were disclosed as non-existent).
23 See In re Hendry, 77 B.R. 85, 90-91 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1987) (holding debtor's misrepresentation of
cattle as collateral, which he did not own, defrauded creditors).
24 Cf In re Anand, 210 B.R. 456, 458-59 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997) affd sub nom. Anand v. Nat'l Republic
Bank of Chi., 239 B.R. 511 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (explaining that in exchanging assets, courts compare values of
what debtors give to creditors against what debtors receive from creditors).
25 Cf Bland v. Farmworker Creditors, 308 B.R. 109, 116 (S.D. Ga. 2003) (explaining unsecured creditors'
best chance for repayment on their claims comes from unencumbered assets).
26 See, e.g., Bayer Corp. v. MascoTech, Inc. (In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc.), 269 F.3d 726, 743 (6th Cir.
2001) (discussing that financing statement put party on notice); United States v. Scottsbluff Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. (In re Great Western Sugar), 902 F.2d 351, 353 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1990) ("The [creditor] could have
avoided this suit by checking the liens of the [debtors] to determine whether other liens on the sugar beets
existed"); In re Moon Thai & Japanese, Inc., 448 B.R. 576, 578-579 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011) (emphasizing
counsels' mistake of failing to check U.C.C. filings); In re SMTC Mfg. of Tex., 421 B.R. 251, 314 (Bankr.
W.D. Tex. 2009) (stating due diligence would have revealed debtor's bank loan and lenders' security
interests); In re Mgmt. by Innovation, Inc., 321 B.R. 742, 745-46 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005) (remarking that
lease at issue sufficiently explained what collateral was encumbered by which security interests and stating
that creditors are obligated to read lease in its entirety); Dyer v. Honea, 557 S.E.2d 20, 26 (Ga. Ct. App.
2001) (rejecting fraud claim for lack of due diligence); Kubota Tractor Corp. v. Citizens & S. Nat'1 Bank,
403 S.E.2d 218, 223 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (acknowledging filed financing statements reasonably put third
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One way to think of Article 9 is as a "how to" guide for lenders that tells the
lender how to conduct due diligence into the legal rights surrounding the collateral.
What I mean by this is that Article 9 does not tell the lender how to conduct due
diligence into the value of the collateral (that is for appraisers and other valuation
experts). 27 However, it does tell the lender how to conduct due diligence into the
legal rights. Specifically, Article 9 tells the lender how to determine whether the
collateral is encumbered by legal or equitable rights. 28
The crucial role of due diligence in Article 9 is explained by the way in which
the Uniform Commercial Code was drafted. The drafters of the Code looked to the
actual practices of business parties and drafted it to reflect and incorporate existing
practice. 2 9 The Code was not the imposition of a set of rules imposed by legal
technocrats on businesses without regard to whether the law had any resemblance to
30
actual business practice. It was the other way around. Actual business practice
drove the drafting of the Code. Professors Gillette and Walt described the drafting
of the Code this way:
The UCC was originally promulgated under the auspices of the
American Law Institute and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in the 1940s in order to
bring a greater level of certainty and predictability to an
increasingly national commercial system. The UCC was intended
to deal not only with sales, but with a range of transactions
involving commercial parties, from the use of negotiable
instruments to secured transactions. The entire project was headed
by Professor Karl Llewellyn of the Columbia Law School. Much
of the UCC . . . reveals Llewellyn's commitment to Legal Realism
and to his desire to allow commercial parties to dictate the proper
scope and doctrine of the law that was to govern their practices.
Llewellyn assumed that these parties were in a better position than
judges or legislators to determine socially desirable commercial
arrangements. Thus, in many ways the UCC seeks primarily to
parties on notice); Citizens State Bank v. Peoples Bank, 475 N.E.2d 324, 331 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (noting
due diligence is performed if records are searched before attempting to create security interests); Excel Bank
v. Nat'l Bank of Kan. City, 290 S.W.3d 801, 808 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) ("The present version of the UCC
equates due diligence in this fact pattern with checking for perfected security interests") (footnote omitted);
Stoeckinger v. Presidential Fin. Corp., 948 A.2d 828, 833 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008) (remarking non-performance
of due diligence resulted in mistakenly accepting receivables encumbered by security interests).
27 See In re Okla. City Broad. Co., 112 B.R. 425, 430 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1990) (accepting appraiser's
opinion regarding liquidation value of debtor's collateral).
28 Cf In re Alcon Demolition, Inc., 204 B.R. 440, 447 (Bankr. N.J. 1997) (discussing security interest
creation).
29 See Bazak Int'l Corp. v. Tarrant Apparel Grp., 378 F. Supp. 2d 377, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating
U.C.C. drafters endeavored to create rules according to business norms and practices).
30 See Christopher J.S. Termini, Return on Political Investment: The Puzzle of Ex Ante Investment in
Articles 3 and 4 of the U.C.C., 92 VA. L. REV. 1023, 1029-30 (2006) (noting influence of private lawyers
and general counsel for financial institutions in creating U.C.C.).
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give state sanction to private rules developed by merchants . . . .
Llewellyn believed that the courts that would inevitably be required
to interpret these provisions should do so by reference to the
practices of the trade under investigation, rather than by the
imposition of some external standard of appropriate commercial
conduct. 31
Lenders, of course, conducted due diligence in making loan decisions before the
UCC was developed, and the drafters of the Code were guided by the actual
practices of lenders. 32
Article 9 reflects Llewellyn's approach to the entirety of the UCC. One
commentator at the time of Article 9's creation wrote:
Among the chief advantages of the Code are its structure and
approach. For one thing, instead of relying on a priori concepts,
the draftsmen sought to probe the expectations of the business
community, an effort facilitated by the length of time available for
preparing the Code. And, having found those expectations, the
draftsmen tried to express them in words that make sense to
businessmen (and consequently perhaps make nonsense to
attorneys). To the codifiers it seemed that a financier should be
enabled to tell rapidly what his rights would be under a projected
loan; under current law by the time those rights are ascertained the
loan may well have fallen through. 3 3
As Gilmore himself stated:
In a sense the unified structure of personal property security law
had already been built: all that remained was to knock down the
scaffolding which had been a temporary necessity during
31 CLAYTON P. GILLETTE & STEVEN D. WALT, SALES LAW: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 1-2 (2d ed.
2009). Karl Llewellyn was the Chief Reporter of the Code, and appointed Grant Gilmore to serve as a
reporter for Article 9. 2 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 290 n. 2 (1965).
Llewellyn appointed Gilmore to this task because Gilmore shared Llewellyn's view of the appropriate
approach to the drafting of the uniform code. Id.
32 GILLETTE, supra note 31, at 2 (remarking drafters of UCC generally relied on commercial parties within
trade to establish legal standards of conduct).
33 n _1_.... I- _ _ ++ C _ _ * n -a-c A Z I AI
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construction. Article 9 is not so much a new start or fresh approach
as it is a reflection of work long since accomplished.34
Interestingly enough, the phrase "due diligence" does not appear in any of the
sections of Article 9. It is mentioned only in Comment 2, Example 3 to section 9-
316.35 Yet, the codification of the due diligence process lies at the heart of Article
9.36 Even though the phrase may not appear in the text of the Code, lawyers and the
37courts certainly see its presence.
34 GILMORE, supra note 31, at 290 (footnote omitted). Article 9 "was designed to allow all known forms of
security transactions to continue to be carried on without substantial change." Id. at 299. In a later article,
Gilmore added these further observations:
I talked yesterday about the patterns and techniques of inventory and receivables
financing which came into use between 1900 and 1950. In drafting article 9, there was
no great problem in dealing with those transactions: all that had to be done was to
simplify the legal framework so that businessmen and bankers could go on doing what
they were already doing to everyone's satisfaction.
Grant Gilmore, Article 9: What It Does Not Dofor the Future, 26 LA. L. REV. 300, 300 (1966).
Professors White and Summers described the development of Article 9 in a bit more colorful language
with their allusion to Greek myth:
Although Article 9 was the most innovative of the original Code articles, it did not
spring full grown from the forehead of Grant Gilmore, Allison Dunham, or even Karl
Llewellyn. The drafters drew heavily on a large body of separate pre-Code personal
property security law.
JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1148 (6th ed. 2010).
35 U.C.C.§ 9-316 cmt. 2 (2011). The phrase "due diligence" is not a defined term under Article 9, and it is
not a definedterm under the general definitions in Article 1 of the Code. However, it is mentioned in section
1-202, which provides for the meaning of "notice" and "knowledge." Id. at 1-202. Subsection (f) provides
in pertinent part:
An organization exercises due diligence if it maintains reasonable routines for
communicating significant information to the person conducting the transaction and
there is reasonable compliance with the routines. Due diligence does not require an
individual acting for the organization to communicate information unless the
communication is part of the individual's regular duties or the individual has reason to
know of the transaction, and that the transaction would be materially affected by the
information.
Id. at § 1-202(f).
36 Article 9 is designed to "push secured parties to do what due diligence and good business practice would
dictate anyway: confirm the debtor-supplied information by examining public records to be sure they know
who the debtor is, what its status is, whether there are peculiarities in its articles, etc." Harry C. Sigman,
Twenty Questions About Filing Under Revised Article 9: The Rules of the Game Under New Part 5, 74 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 861, 867 (1999).
As reflected in one of the comments, Article 9 is expressly designed to force due diligence procedures on
creditors.
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The courts are fully aware that due diligence requirements are embedded in the
Code, and the fundamental role of due diligence starts with the nature of the
security agreement itself. The Seventh Circuit explicitly recognized the role of the
security agreement in the lender's due diligence process.
A security agreement is a special kind of contract for which an
important audience is third parties who need to know how much
collateral has become encumbered. A potential creditor's decision
whether to provide credit . . . is contingent on the creditor's
understanding of the extent of pre-existing security interests. An
unclear statement of that extent should be avoided at all costs: if the
creditor reads it reasonably, but too narrowly, when extending
credit, it will be out of luck when the debtor defaults. If the
potential creditor on the other hand takes a more conservative
position and, fearful of the ambiguity, decides not to extend credit,
the party seeking that credit is penalized in its access to capital by
itself, but only a simple record providing a limited amount of information (financing
statement) ... .
The notice itself indicates merely that a person may have a security interest in the
collateral indicated. Further inquiry from the parties concerned will be necessary to
disclose the complete state of affairs. Section 9-210 provides a statutory procedure
under which the secured party, at the debtor's request, may be required to make
disclosure. However, in many cases, information may be forthcoming without the need
to resort to the formalities of that section.
U.C.C. § 9-502 cmt. 2 (emphasis added).
3 One commercial lawyer discussed the crucial role of due diligence as required by Article 9.
Not only will these changes simplify the process of perfecting security interests by
filing under Revised Article 9, but after the transition to Revised Article 9 is effective,
due diligence practices and the process of determining the relative priority of security
interests perfected by filing will be streamlined. To the extent that filing multiple
financing statements was necessary to perfect a security interest under Old Article 9,
due diligence was required to ascertain the location of collateral and priority of interests
could be determined only by searching the records in each of the relevant filing offices.
Since Revised Article 9 limits the number of offices where filings can be made to
perfect a security interest, once the transition to Revised Article 9 is complete, the
scope of due diligence and the number of searches that will have to be conducted by
secured parties will be more limited than under Old Article 9.
The fact that perfecting security interests in, and performing due diligence regarding,
many types of assets has been simplified by Revised Article 9 will reduce the actual
out-of-pocket costs and time associated with documenting secured transactions.
Anyone hoping to finance a film with secured loans could benefit directly from this
simple change in the law, but this modest change will not have its maximum impact
unless other changes find their way into the law.
Stevens, supra note 20, at 219-20 (footnotes omitted) ("Revised Article 9 has reduced the cost of perfecting
many security interests by streamlining the procedures for perfecting security interests in (and conducting
due diligence searches regarding) most types of personal property. .. ). Id. at 240.
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the shoddy work of its prior creditor-another result to be
avoided.38
In other words, one of the key purposes of the security agreement is to enable later
creditors to perform due diligence. It is a document designed to be read by third
parties, not just the parties to the contract.39
The concept of due diligence is also embedded in section 9-203 and the Code
sections governing perfection. Section 9-203 governs the attachment of a security
interest.40 In lay terms, the "attachment" of a security interest is basically the
creation of one. For this reason, 9-203 may be the most important section of Article
9 because without attachment, the rest of Article 9 dealing with priority and
enforcement becomes, for the most part, moot.4 1 That is why section 9-203 is at the
foundational core of Article 9.
"Perfection" is one of the other crucial concepts in Article 9.42 "Perfection" may
be thought of this way. The entire reason why a lender wants collateral is to enable
it to have the right to take and sell a piece of property to raise cash to repay all, or at
least part, of the loan in the event the borrower breaches its promise to repay. In
most circumstances, the lender wants to ensure that it has the exclusive right to the
collateral, and that no one else has a right to take the collateral.43 In other words, the
lender wants to be in the position where it and it alone has the right to take the
collateral, and no other lender will be able to take the collateral ahead of it. Thus,
38 Shelby Cnty. State Bank v. Van Dienst Supply Co., 303 F.3d 832, 839 (7th Cir. 2002).
39 See id. (noting importance of security agreements to third parties).
40 U.C.C. section 9-203(a) provides: "A security interest attaches to collateral when it becomes enforceable
against the debtor with respect to the collateral, unless an agreement expressly postpones the time of
attachment." U.C.C. § 9-203(a).
With respect to section 9-203(b), this paper will focus on section 9-203(b)(1), (2), (3) and (3)(A) and
(3)(B). These sections provide:
(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (c) through (i), a security interest is
enforceable against the debtor and third parties with respect to the collateral only if: (1)
value has been given; (2) the debtor has rights in the collateral or the power to transfer
rights in the collateral to a secured party; and (3) one of the following conditions is met:
(A) the debtor has authenticated a security agreement that provides a description of the
collateral . . . [or] (B) the collateral is not a certificated security and is in the possession
of the secured party under Section 9-313 pursuant to the debtor's security agreement.
Id. at § 9-203(b).
To translate section 9-203(b) into simplified, plain English, a security interest attaches (comes into
existence) if (1) a lender makes a loan, (2) the debtor grants a security interest in an item of collateral to the
lender, and (3) either the debtor signs a written security agreement describing the collateral or hands over
possession of the collateral to the lender pursuant to a written or oral security agreement.
41 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND ET AL., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES (Frederick H. Miller ed., 2012)
(describing importance and inseparable nature of enforceability and attachment).
42See Claire Moore Dickerson, New Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Are Certificated Shares
Subject to a Perfected Security Interest if Held in Escrow?, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 407, 419 (1989)
(describing critical importance of attachment and perfection of security interest).
43 See, e.g., Kimbell Foods, Inc. v. Republic Nat. Bank of Dall., 557 F.2d 491, 503 (5th Cir. 1977)
(asserting perfection protects secured creditor against later-filed claims of other creditors).
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when a lender takes a security interest in collateral, it wants to tell the entire world
that it has a security interest and warn all others that it is first when it comes to
taking the collateral in the event of default.44 Equally important, a lender wants to
know if another lender preceded it and has already taken a security interest.45
Because if there is a prior security interest, the subsequent lender faces the risk of
not having any value in the collateral after the earlier secured creditor has exercised
its enforcement rights.46 Therefore, lenders want the ability to tell the entire world
that it has taken a security in collateral, and they want to know if anyone else has
already taken a security interest.
Article 9 provides the means for a lender to notify the world that it has taken a
security interest in collateral. The process of notifying the world is called
"perfection."4 7 Once a security interest attaches, lenders then want to perfect the
security interest. By perfecting the security interest, the lender tells the world that it
has a security interest and therefore has priority (as a general matter) over any
subsequent lender who also takes a security interest in the same collateral. 48
Article 9 provides for several different methods of perfection (the proper way to
perfect depends on the type of collateral involved). OJne way to perfect a security
interest is by filing a financing statement (usually with the office of the Secretary of
44 See Van Dusen Acceptance Corp. v. Gough, 466 F.2d 51, 52 (9th Cir. 1972) (affirming statutory
purpose of perfection requirement is to give notice to future creditors).
45 See id.
46 See Kimbell, 557 F.2d at 503 (affirming that earlier secured creditor with perfected interest has priority
over subsequent creditors); see also Justin M. Vogel, Note, Perfecting Security Interests In Unregistered
Copyrights: Preemption of the Federal Copyright Act and How Filing In Accordance With Article 9 Leads
to the Creation of a Bankruptcy "Force Play", 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 463, 466 (2002) (explaining
first creditor to perfect security interest obtains first priority and all other secured creditors are estopped from
perfecting interest in same property).
47 See U.C.C. § 9-301 (2011).
48 The general priority rules are set forth in U.C.C. sections 9-317(a), 9-322(a). Section 9-322(a) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, priority among conflicting security
interests and agricultural liens in the same collateral is determined according to the
following rules: (1) Conflicting perfected security interests and agricultural liens rank
according to priority in time of filing or perfection. Priority dates from the earlier of the
time a filing covering the collateral is first made or the security interest or agricultural
lien is first perfected, if there is no period thereafter when there is neither filing nor
perfection. (2) A perfected security interest or agricultural lien has priority over a
conflicting unperfected security interest or agricultural lien. (3) The first security
interest or agricultural lien to attach or become effective has priority if conflicting
security interests and agricultural liens are unperfected.
Id. at § 9-322(a).
It is important to note that these rules are general and subject to exceptions. See, e.g., id. at §9-324
(discussing priority of purchase money security interests).
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State in the appropriate state). 49 A lender may also perfect a security interest in
tangible property by taking possession of the collateral.so
In sum, the concept and importance of perfection is inseparable from lender due
diligence. Indeed, one of the crucial goals of due diligence is for a lender to
determine if a prior creditor has perfected a security interest in the collateral that has
been proposed for a loan."' The concept and mechanics of due diligence exist for
the purpose of enabling creditors to conduct due diligence, and due diligence would
be fruitless without perfection.5 2
II. EXAMPLES OF ARTICLE 9's DUE DILIGENCE REQUIREMENTS
The due diligence requirements embedded in section 9-203 and the rules
regarding perfection demonstrate Article 9's role as a "how to" guide. To keep
matters simple, without affecting the substance of the thesis, I will focus on section
9-203(b)(3)(A) and (B). Under subparagraphs 3(A) and 3(B), there are basically
two ways of creating a security interest. Under subparagraph 3(A), a security
interest attaches when the borrower authenticates a written security agreement (and
when the other requirements of section 9-203(b) are satisfied).53  Under
subparagraph 3(B), a security attaches when the lender takes possession of the
collateral (and when the other requirements of section 9-203(b) are satisfied).5 4
Subparagraph 3(B) does not require a written security agreement; the security
agreement may be oral.5
The following hypothetical illustrates these points. Suppose Dan Debtor owns
one Monet painting valued at $10 million and wishes to borrow $9 million. First
Bank is willing to make the loan, and the parties agree that the painting will be the
collateral for the loan. In one scenario, the requirements of section 9-203(b)(1) and
(2) are met, and the parties sign a written security agreement. The painting remains
on display in Dan Debtor's home. In a second scenario, the requirements of section
9-203(b)(1) and (2) are met, but there is no writing to document the transaction;
First Bank simply takes possession of the painting and places it in its vault. In both
scenarios, First Bank's security interest in the painting has attached.
49 See id. at § 9-501 cmt. 2; see also LINDA J. RUSCH & STEPHEN L. SEPINUCK, PROBLEMS AND
MATERIALS ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS 220-21 (2d ed. 2010).
50 Article 9 provides four methods of perfection: (1) filing an initial financing statement; (2) possession of
the collateral by the secured creditor; (3) "control" of certain types of collateral; and (4) automatic perfection
for certain types of transactions. See BROOK, supra note 12, at 18.
51 See Kenneth B. Axe, Creation, Perfection and Enforcement of Security Interests in Intellectual Property
Under Revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 119 BANKING L.J. 62, 70-72 (2002) (examining
lender due diligence in searching for prior security interests in collateral).
52See Mottaz v. Keidel (In re Keidel), 613 F.2d 172, 174 (7th Cir. 1980) ("Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, the rule, which is intended to reward diligence in perfection, applies even when the competing creditor
has knowledge of the unperfected security interest").
53 U.C.C. 9-203(b)(3)(A).
54 Id at §9-203(b)(3)(B).
'~See id (noting perfection occurs when goods are possessed by secured party).
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Now, First Bank wants to perfect its security interest. In the first scenario
where Dan Debtor has retained possession of the painting, the only way for the
bank to perfect its security interest is by filing an initial financing statement in the
Secretary of State's office in the state of Dan Debtor's principal residence (which the
bank dutifully does). 56 In the second scenario where the painting has been placed in
the bank's vault, the bank does not need to do anything further to perfect. Taking
possession of the collateral constitutes perfection of the bank's security interest
pursuant to section 9-313.
A further elaboration of this hypothetical provides the basis to explain how
Article 9 acts as a "how to" guide in conducting due diligence. Suppose a year later
(and the painting is still valued at $10 million), Dan Debtor goes to Second Bank,
seeks to borrow $9 million, and offers his Monet as collateral. Second Bank is
willing to make the loan, but wants to make sure that it and it alone will have a
security interest in the painting. In order to ensure this, it must conduct its due
diligence.
All banks know that proper due diligence in these circumstances requires a
search of the UCC filings in the appropriate state. 8 In the first scenario where First
Bank has filed an initial financing statement, Second Bank's search of the records
will reveal the existence of First Bank's prior security interest. In this situation,
Article 9's rules regarding perfection have worked to protect both First and Second
Bank. They have protected First Bank by enabling it to tell the world that it is first
in line with respect to the painting. They have also protected Second Bank because
the notice mechanism of perfection has revealed that it will not have the first right
to collateral. With this knowledge, Second Bank will decline to make a loan it
would otherwise regret.
What about the second scenario where First Bank has possession of the
painting? Second Bank's search of the UCC records will reveal no filing by First
Bank. At this point, would it be prudent for Second Bank to make the loan and take
a security interest in the painting because of the absence of a filing in the UCC
records? The clear answer is "no." Because Article 9 permits perfection of a
security interest through possession (even in the absence of any tangible writings to
memorialize the transaction), Article 9 says in effect: In order to conduct thorough
and proper due diligence, the lender should determine the location of the collateral
56 For individuals (human beings), the initial financing statement must be filed in the state where the
individual's principal residence is located. See id. at § 9-301 (providing "while a debtor is located in a
jurisdiction, the local law of that jurisdiction governs perfection"); see also id. at § 9-307(b)(1) (codifying
"[a] debtor who is an individual is located at the individual's principal residence").
57 "Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), a secured party may perfect a security interest in
tangible negotiable documents, goods, instruments, money, or tangible chattel paper by taking possession of
the collateral." Id. at § 9-313(a).
58 See Pascack Cmty. Bank v. Universal Funding, LLP, 16 A.3d 1097, 1107 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2011)
(remarking "a commercially reasonable lien search is 'a search of the records of the [relevant state or county]
filing office, under the debtor's correct name, using the filing office's standard search logic'") (internal
citation omitted).
2012] 573
ABILA WREVIEW
and inspect it.59 Therefore, Second Bank must tell Dan Debtor that it wants to see
the painting. When Dan Debtor tells Second Bank that the painting is available for
inspection in First Bank's vault, this bit of information serves as notice to Second
Bank that First Bank may have a security interest in the painting, and that Second
Bank needs to inquire into First Bank's relationship to the painting. Second Bank
would thus need to contact First Bank and ask why the painting is located in First
Bank's vault. When Second Bank is informed that the painting is in the vault
because First Bank has a security interest in it, the due diligence process will have
worked to protect Second Bank from making a regrettable loan. Hence, even
though there is no section in Article 9 that says anything like "lenders must
determine the location of the collateral and ask to inspect it in order to learn of other
encumbrances on the collateral," an understanding of how Article 9 works reveals
that it is indeed a "how to" guide for conducting due diligence.
The "how to" guide becomes more complicated when proceeds are involved.
For example, suppose Jeans Store, Inc. ("JSI") operates a store selling high fashion
jeans. It finances the purchase of its expensive inventory through a line of credit
from Finance Corp., which is secured by the jeans themselves. Finance Corp.
perfects its security interest by filing an initial financing statement in the proper
state, and the financing statement indicates that the collateral consists of "all jeans
now owned or hereafter acquired." JSI is located next door to a luxury high rise
building in which Dan Debtor lives. Dan Debtor picks out ten highly fashionable
jeans in JSI and offers the owner a Vermeer painting in exchange for the jeans.
Both Dan Debtor and the owner agree that this barter exchange is mutually
beneficial for both, and the exchange is made. Finance Corp. has no knowledge of
this exchange. The owner of JSI then proudly displays the painting in her
showroom.
In order to expand her successful business, JSI applies for a $5 million loan at
Third Bank and offers the Vermeer painting as collateral. Third Bank begins its due
diligence. It asks to inspect the collateral, and one of its employees confirms that it
is on display in the JSI showroom. The bank's appraiser confirms the $8 million
value of the painting. The bank then conducts a search of the UCC filings in the
proper state and sees Finance Corp.'s filing under the name Jeans Store, Inc.
However, the filing indicates that Finance Corp.'s collateral consists of "jeans";
there is no indication that the painting is part of the collateral.
Thus, Third Bank has confirmed that JSI has possession of the painting and that
the UCC records show no filing indicating the painting as any creditor's collateral.
Does this mean that Third Bank can make the loan with assurance that it will have
priority in the painting in the event of default? The answer is no.
The answer is no because Article 9 requires further due diligence by Third
Bank. Even though Finance Corp.'s filing does not indicate a security interest in
any painting, Finance Corp. has a perfected security interest in the painting. The
5 See U.C.C. § 9-203(b).
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reason is because the painting constitutes "proceeds" of the jeans. 6 0 Under section 9-
315(a)(2), Finance Corp.'s security interest in the jeans (including the jeans
transferred to Dan Debtor) continued in and attached to the painting. 61 Furthermore,
Finance Corp.'s security interest in the painting is perfected by virtue of its initial
financing statement which indicates the collateral as "all jeans now owned or
hereafter acquired." In other words, Finance Corp.'s security interest in the painting
is perfected even though its initial financing statement says nothing about a
painting. This is correct because of section 9-315(d).62 In plain English, Finance
Corp.'s security interest in the painting attached and remained perfected beyond 21
days after JSI acquired the painting because (A) Finance Corp. filed an initial
financing statement covering the original collateral, the jeans; and (B) the painting
is collateral (in this case, the painting is considered to be JSI's "equipment") in
which a security interest may be properly perfected by filing in the office in which
the financing statement has been filed.63 In other words, Finance Corp. could perfect
its security interest in the painting (or equipment) in the same office in which it
filed the financing statement for the jeans; and (C) the painting was not acquired
with cash proceeds; it was acquired in a barter exchange for jeans.
The meaning of all this for due diligence is that any bank considering the
making of a loan with the Vermeer as collateral, must ask how and under what
circumstances did JSI acquire the painting. It is not enough to confirm possession
and check the UCC records. By conducting due diligence into how JSI acquired the
painting, Third Bank will learn that JSI acquired the painting in exchange for jeans
and it will see that Finance Corp.'s initial financing statement indicating "jeans" also
60 "Proceeds" are defined to include "whatever is acquired upon the sale, lease, license, exchange, or other
disposition of collateral." Id. at §9-102(a)(64).
61 Section § 9-315(a)(2) provides: "(a) Except as otherwise provided in this article and in Section 2-403(2):
... (2) a security interest attaches to any identifiable proceeds of collateral." Id. at § 9-315(a)(2).
6Section §9-315(d) provides: "A perfected security interest in proceeds becomes unperfected on the 21st
day after the security interest attaches to the proceeds unless: (1) the following conditions are satisfied: (A) a
filed financing statement covers the original collateral; (B) the proceeds are collateral in which a security
interest may be perfected by filing in the office in which the financing statement has been filed; and (C) the
proceeds are not acquired with cash proceeds." Id. at § 9-315(d).
63 "Equipment" is defined to mean "goods other than inventory, farm products, or consumer goods." Id. at
§9-102(a)(33). "'Goods' means all things that are moveable when a security interest attaches." Id. at §9-
102(a)(44). "This Article also retains the four mutually-exclusive 'types' of collateral that consist of goods:
'consumer goods,' 'equipment,' 'farm products,' and 'inventory.' . . . The classes of goods are mutually
exclusive. For example, the same property cannot simultaneously be both equipment and inventory." Id. at§
9-102 cmt. 4.a.
The term "equipment" is designed as a catch-all for any good that does not fall into one of the other
categories of goods. Id. ("goods are 'equipment' if they do not fall into another category"). Classification of
goods depends on the primary use of the goods by the debtor. See Coop. Fin. Ass'n, v. B & J Cattle Co., 937
P.2d 915, 918 (Col. App. 1997) (explaining classification of goods is question of fact).
So, in the hypothetical, the jeans are inventory. See U.C.C. §9-102(a)(48)(B) (inventory includes goods
"held by a person for sale"). And the painting is "equipment."
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acts to perfect Finance Corp.'s security interest in the painting. Commercial lenders
know this is what Article 9 requires in the way of due diligence. 64
The complexity and thoroughness of the rules regarding due diligence are
further exemplified in section 9-315(d) once again. Section 9-315(d) begins by
providing "A perfected security interest in proceeds becomes unperfected on the
21st day after the security interest attaches to the proceeds unless" one of three
65
exceptions is met. For purposes of this discussion, only the first exception will be
addressed. To paraphrase (in part), a perfected security interest in proceeds
becomes unperfected on the 21st day after which it attaches to the proceeds unless:
(1) the following conditions are satisfied: (A) a filed financing
statement covers the original collateral; (B) the proceeds are
collateral in which a security interest may be perfected by filing in
the office in which the financing statement has been filed; and (C)
the proceeds are not acquired with cash proceeds.6 6
It is (C) on which I would like to focus. Why does the security interest in proceeds
become unperfected on the 21st day if the proceeds are acquired with cash
proceeds? As in the example discussed above, if the jeans store owner barters jeans
for a painting, the security interest in the jeans (the proceeds) remains perfected for
the effective term of the initial financing statement (which is five years, assuming
the financing statement has the full term remaining). 6 7
However, if the jeans store owner sells jeans for cash (which are cash proceeds)
and then uses those cash proceeds to buy a painting (which is proceeds of
proceeds), the security interest in the painting lapses on the 21st day after
68 ohrwr
attachment. In other words, the use of cash results in a dramatic effect on the
security interest.
So why does the presence of cash in the transaction make such a difference?
The only plausible explanation lies in due diligence considerations. In the event of
a barter exchange (jeans for painting), a subsequent lender that is offered the
painting as collateral may and should ask how the painting was acquired. The
buyer should be able to produce a document memorializing the exchange, and this
document will require the lender to conduct due diligence into prior security
interests in the painting.69 Even if there is no documentation, the truthful answer
64 This hypothetical demonstrates that the only parties who should engage in secured lending on personal
property are those with a deep knowledge of Article 9. Secured lending is not designed to be a casual
transaction for laymen. The same also applies to secured lending on real property.
65 U.C.C. § 9-315(d) (codifying three exceptions where perfected security interest does not become
unperfected).
66 Id.
67 See id. at § 9-515(a).
68 Proceeds of proceeds are proceeds. Id at § 9-102 cmt. 13.c.
69 See, e.g., ELDON H. REILEY, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 6:11 (2012) (explaining
that secured party must be able to trace proceeds back to collateral and positing that tracing is easy where
proceeds are anything other than cash).
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that the painting was acquired in a barter exchange for jeans should prompt the
lender to conduct due diligence into the prior owner of the painting and the
existence of prior security interests.
However, the situation is different if cash is used. If the lender asks for
documentation for the purchase of the painting, the bill of sale will show that it was
paid in full with cash. At that point, the lender may ask "where did you get the
cash?" However, cash is fungible. How can the lender know if the cash is directly
traceable to jeans (and therefore proceeds) or whether the cash is traceable to some
other source (in which case it is not proceeds)? The sources of cash are difficult to
trace and too easy to cover up. The Article 9 drafters apparently were aware of this
nature of cash and took it into account in setting the guidelines for due diligence
requirements. 0
These hypotheticals illustrate that due diligence is inextricably embedded in
Article 9. Article 9 exists (to a large extent) to serve as a structure to enable due
diligence. In some instances, the necessary due diligence rules are simple. In
others, the rules are highly complex. That is part of the beauty of Article 9. It
anticipates a wide myriad of due diligence issues.
III. THE LEGISLATIVE GUIDE'S FAILURE TO ADDRESS LENDER DUE DILIGENCE
ISSUES
The fundamental flaw with international attempts to harmonize secured
transactions law is that their approach is the opposite of the history of the Uniform
Commercial Code. Instead of looking to and incorporating a "bottoms up"
approach of allowing actual business practices to inform the lawmaking, attempts
such as the Legislative Guide are "top down" inventions by a select technocratic
group attempting to impose its view on commerce." The problem with this
approach was recognized by another commentator.
70 See id. (describing difficulties of tracing cash proceeds).
71 Professor Stephan described the UNCITRAL process in the following way: "What these bodies seem to
represent, in other words, is a fairly complete realization of the technocratic ideal of lawmaking." Paul B.
Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in International Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT'L L.
743, 756 (1999).
He goes on to state:
The project of unifying substantive international commercial law necessarily depends
on a technocratic legal process. I have raised at least a reasonable suspicion that this
process has its own political economy with predictable and unattractive implications for
what it produces. International unification instruments display a strong tendency either
to compromise legal certainty or to advance the agendas of interest groups. In either
case they offer no obvious gains as compared to rules produced through the national
legislative process.
Id. at 788.
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More generally, in accounts of modernization, it is now time to
give up claims to universalism in favor of more differentiated
analyses and prescriptions for particular times and particular places.
We need to locate our evaluations of commercial law reform within
a better understanding of how local entrepreneurial networks and
credit institutions function on the ground.7 2
That should be the key question: How do local lenders conduct their due diligence
in deciding whether to extend credit? It seems that the proponents of the
Legislative Guide have overlooked or ignored how actual lenders conduct business,
and have instead engaged in an effort to impose a legalistically contrived structure
on lenders.
How can any attempt to harmonize or unify varying laws succeed when the
actual due diligence practices vary so widely because of the wide divergence in
laws? The differences in law are fundamental. In some countries, there is no
system for giving, or requiring, notice of a security interest.73 In some countries, it
is not possible to grant a security interest in an item of collateral to more than one
creditor.7 4 Not all countries permit a security interest in after-acquired property.
72 Macdonald, supra note 11, at 650.
73 See Bazinas, supra note 4, at 139 (footnotes omitted).
In many jurisdictions, there are no public notice systems with respect to security rights
in movable assets. This means that a potential secured creditor has to rely on
representations of a potential debtor or on its own independent search to find out
whether an asset offered by a debtor as collateral for credit is encumbered by another
security right, and, if so, to whom the security right has been granted. In other
jurisdictions, the security agreement itself has to be vetted by a public official before it
can be registered. The absence of any registration system or the existence of a
document registration system often results in delays and costs. In addition, in the case
of a document registration system, the confidentiality of a transaction may also be
violated even if public access to the registry is limited (which of course will also limit
the usefulness of the registry).
Id.
74See id. at 140.
As already mentioned, in jurisdictions in which transfer- and retention-of-title devices
form the main non-possessory security rights, it is not possible for a debtor to give
more than one security right to a secured creditor or, in other words, to use the full
value of its assets (although, in some jurisdictions, the buyer in a retention-of-title sale
may use its expectancy right as collateral for credit). Once more than one security right
may be created in an asset so that the debtor may be able to use all the value of its
assets to obtain credit, the question of priority arises (that is which secured creditor will
be paid first, if the debtor defaults and the asset's value is not enough to satisfy all
secured obligations). A security right will have little value if the secured creditor cannot
determine its order of priority before extending credit.
Id.
7 See id. at 148.
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Such differences present the possibility that a security interest in collateral created
under the law of one country may not be recognized under the law of another
country if the collateral crosses a national border.7 6
A lender that conducts business solely within its home borders will probably
not be familiar with the proper way to conduct due diligence in another country if
the laws of the other country vary in a material way, and there is nothing in the
Legislative Guide to guide that lender if that is the situation." Because the
Legislative Guide provides no guidance on such due diligence obstacles, its value is
questionable. Does this mean that cross-border lending has been restricted or is
suffering from a lack of capital? The following section addresses this question, and
the answer is a definite "no."
IV. THE EXPLOSIVE GROWTH IN CROSS-BORDER LENDING WITHOUT THE NEED
FOR THE LEGISLATIVE GUIDE
Proponents of the Legislative Guide claim that a harmonization of secured
transactions law will lead to increases in the amount of credit available to
borrowers, and therefore spur economic activity. A notable proponent asserts:
The differences between secured credit regimes, in terms of both
substantive principles and their procedural effectuation, create
uncertainty and transaction costs that lower the expected value of a
transaction to the creditor. Once again, these differences likely
result in higher interest rates and, in some cases, foregone
transactions. Indeed, the problem may even be worse, because
secured credit law is designed to operate largely without court
supervision."
Another proponent expressly claims that the Legislative Guide "is likely to result in
an increase of the amount of credit available."7 9
Many States with traditional pledge-based systems only permit grantors to create
security rights in existing assets that they own at the time of the creation of a security
right. They are not able to grant a security right in assets not yet in existence or that
they have not yet acquired at the time of the conclusion of the secured transaction. The
concern is to protect debtors from over-commitment of their assets, in particular their
future assets, to secured creditors.
Id.
76 See id. at 145-46 (indicating security right in movable asset created in one state may not be recognized
under law of state where asset was moved).
77 Cf Lucinda A. Low, When Your Client Needs an Agent Overseas, 4 BuS. L. TODAY 45 (1995)
(reminding lawyers to perform due diligence on foreign repsentatives who will serve their interests in
international transactions).
78 COhen, supra note 1, at 176 (emphasis added).
7Bazinas, supra note 4, at 135.
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Such concerns about the amount of internationally available credit have been
raised since (at least) the 1970's. In that decade, UNCITRAL retained Professor
Ulrich Drobnig of the Max Planck-Institute to prepare a study on the legal
principles governing security interests in a variety of legal systems around the
world.80 The purpose was to determine the possibility of harmonizing such laws.81
The study, published in 1977, comprehensively examined the law
of nineteen nations, noting the similarities and differences among
them in their treatment of basic legal issues in secured credit. Not
surprisingly, the differences were great. More important for
present purposes, though, the Drobnig report also contained
assessments to 'help to consider the necessity or desirability of
framing rules in this field on an international level, especially for
the international movement of goods subject to security interests.' 82
For those in favor of harmonization, the report was bleak. Drobnig wrote:
It would seem that international legislation in the form of a
convention providing uniform rules of substantive and conflicts law
is not appropriate in this case. As against international sales or
international transportation or the international circulation of
negotiable instruments, transnational incidence of security interests
is as yet relatively moderate. It would probably be difficult to
obtain sufficient government support for an international
conference dealing with the relatively technical topic of security
interests; and even if the text of an international instrument could
be agreed upon, national parliaments would probably be slow and
perhaps even reluctant to ratify such a text. 83
Under the Guide, the central premise of a secured credit regime lies in the fact that the
security against the risk of debtor default is likely to result in an increase of the amount
of credit available and in a decrease of its cost. In an international context, secured
credit becomes even more important as new risks are added. Movable assets cross
national borders and rights created in the assets in one jurisdiction may not be
recognized in another jurisdiction. In addition, the assets may become subject to rights
of third parties in the new jurisdiction.
Id.
80 Cohen, supra note 7, at 432.
8 See id. at 432-33.
82 Id at 433 (footnotes omitted).
8Report of the Secretary-General: study on security interests, [ 1977] 8 Y.B. Int'l Trade L. 171, 218, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1977.
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Drobnig went on to add, "[m]ere recommendations, even if emanating from an
international organization of the highest repute, will not command sufficient moral
or other support for adoption by any sizeable number of States." 84
Given that the secured transactions laws around the world have not been
harmonized (much less unified),85 one might conclude that the world economy has
suffered and is suffering from a lack of available credit, and that international
lending activity has been curtailed. One might further conclude that the world
economy is hobbled by a situation where borrowers are desperate to borrow and
lenders desperate to lend, with their goals frustrated by the absence of a harmonized
law of secured transactions. Thus, proponents of the Legislative Guide assert that it
is necessary to promote global lending activities.8 6 These assertions beg a few
simple questions: What is the proof that the amount of internationally available
credit is less in the absence of efforts such as the Legislative Guide? In other
words, what is the proof that the absence of harmonization or uniformity in secured
transactions laws is the cause of a reduced amount of money to lend? Have
borrowers around the world suffered from a lack of availability of credit since the
1970's?
If there is, indeed, proof that the global economy has suffered from a lack of
international credit, then the proponents of the Legislative Guide would have a
strong argument that harmonization is needed, perhaps essential to global economic
growth. If, however, international bankers have been able to increase international
lending (despite the absence of a harmonized or unified law), then the question is
raised whether something like the Legislative Guide is necessary in the first place.
History provides the answer. There has been no shortage of internationally
available credit. 87
84 Id.
85 See Cohen, supra note 1, at 188 (advocating for global harmonization while acknowledging lack of
unification).
86 See id. at 177 (illustrating that harmonization would decrease risks and costs of international
transactions).
87 In fact, the opposite appears to be true. The cause of the financial crisis that erupted in 2008 was the
easy international availability of too much credit. In discussing the crisis, one commentator wrote:
But why did banks generously dish out mortgages when they must have known that
their loans might become burdens once the cycle turned? In the past they would have
found themselves with bad loans on their books and thus would likely have exercised
some foresight when giving them out, insisting on good credit ratings of their
customers. But financial innovation ("securitization") meant that they did not need to
keep questionable loans on their books; instead, they could bundle them up and sell
them on the international financial market. This massively increased the global
potential for the creation of credit, and was even more attractive since no capital
requirements applied to intermediation through markets. Risk could be better
diversified, lowering the need to hold capital against it, further increasing the potential
for credit creation. International trading of the resulting securities led to their passing
on to customers in European states (most of which have relatively high savings ratios),
and with them spread the risks from US mortgage loans.
ANDREAS BUSCH, BANKING REGULATION AND GLOBALIZATION 251-52 (Oxford Univ. Press 2009).
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In contrast to unsupported assertions that national differences in secured
transactions law have hindered or impaired borrowers and lenders, this paper
contends that it is more instructive to examine the developments in the international
capital markets since Drobnig's report. Such an examination reveals that bankers
have not stood still, waiting for UNCITRAL to unify or harmonize national laws.
The opposite has occurred. There has been an expansion in international lending
because bankers have invented new mechanisms to facilitate it, with or without a
UN-sponsored harmonization of law.88 The proof of the growth in cross-border
lending is demonstrated by the following fact: From 1977 to 1996, the market size
of international loans increased from $34.2 billion to $349.7 billion.89
In simple terms, securitization is the process by which a lender bundles and converts a pool of loans into
securities which can then be sold to institutional investors. For example, a lender (or a transferee) with
hundreds of mortgage loans secured by houses in the U.S. may securitize the loans by placing them into a
special purpose entity, which then issues securities to investors. The investors' return is derived from the
monthly payments on the mortgages by the hundreds of individual borrowers. Any pool of similar loans may
be securitized. See, e.g., STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ ET AL., SECURITIZATION, STRUCTURED FINANCE AND
CAPITAL MARKETS 8-16 (LexisNexis 2004) (providing example of securitization of automobile loans).
Securitization has been described as the financing or refinancing of income-yielding
assets (receivables) by repackaging them together with suitable enhancements into
tradeable securities with the securities being both secured on the assets and serviced
from the cashflows which they yield. In the context of banks, it involves the pooling of
loans or other assets such as derivatives and using such pools to raise money from
investors who thereby become entitled to receive the loan proceeds. This popular
method of financing is, as such, based on or backed by previously existing financial
assets such as loans; and this accounts for the designation of 'asset-backed securities'.
Virtually all the banks and the major investment dealers are active in creating new
securitization products and issues. Securitization is attractive to the banks, borrowers,
and investors alike because they all derive distinct advantages. For the banks,
securitization means that receivables are turned into cash thereby improving liquidity.
Furthermore, this improves their capital adequacy position because the securitized
assets are written off the books of accounts, resulting in the requirement that there be
less equity. The investors' primary attractions are the opportunity to acquire a safe and
liquid investment in diversified assets, which provides predictable cashflows and low
default rates. The instruments are also liquid and transferable. The arrangement also
normally results in borrowers paying lower interest rates.
AGASHA MUGASHA, THE LAW OF MULTI-BANK FINANCING, SYNDICATED LOANS AND THE SECONDARY
LOAN MARKET 55 (Oxford Univ. Press 2007) (footnotes omitted).
8 See MUGASHA, supra note 87, at 3 (explaining innovative phenomena of multi-bank financing and
syndicated loans which have helped to increase international transactions).
89 See HAL S. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATION 12 (17th
ed. 2010).
The cross-border aspect of finance can arise from the fact that the activity of the
provider and the user of funds may be located in two different countries. A lender can
market and transfer funds to a borrower in another country, or the borrower can seek
and attain funds from the lender in the lender's country.
Id. at 1.
The growth in the market size of international loans has been accompanied (not surprisingly) by growth in
the international banking system.
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Much of this growth is the result of increased use of multi-bank loans, loans
where more than one bank participates in the funding of the loan.
Multi-bank financing occurs when a number of banks act in concert
to extend credit to a borrower. The combination of the banks is
usually highly coordinated, but in some cases the banks act in loose
associations that are linked only by the simultaneous extension of
credit to a borrower. The two main phases of multi-bank financing
are the syndicated loan and secondary loan practices . . . . Viewed
together, the two phases of multi-bank financing comprise a group
of related credit-and-risk transfer techniques that permit the
participants in the financial markets to manage their credit and risk
more precisely.90
One common form of such a loan is called a syndicated loan.
A syndicated loan is one where two or more banks join together to
lend to a single borrower on the basis of a single set of lending
documents, of which the primary document is usually called a 'loan
agreement', 'credit agreement,' 'facility agreement', or 'loan facility
agreement.' All the banks execute the one agreement and there is
privity of contract between the borrower and each of the banks.
Legally, each of the banks has a separate contract with the borrower
even though, for convenience, the separate contracts are printed in
one document. Any security taken for the loan is for the common
benefit of all the banks. They own proportionate interests in it even
though for convenience it may be held or monitored by only one of
them, often the agent bank; or an independent entity, often a
trustee, for the benefit of all.91
The international banking system has been growing in importance as compared [to] the
world economy. Although the trend growth rates in total foreign claims, foreign
currency claims, and cross-border claims slowed during the 2008-2009 financial crisis,
the broader historical trend growth is clear. . . . For example, total foreign claims have
steadily increased as a share of world GDP from below 60 percent in 2002 to nearly 80
percent by the end of 2009, despite a pullback during the financial crisis. Likewise,
cross-border bank assets grew at an average annualized rate in the high teens before
falling somewhat during the financial crisis.
Id. at 208.
90 MUGASHA, supra note 87, at 2.
91 Id. at 22 (footnotes omitted).
The early syndicated loans were simple structures assembled exclusively or nearly so
among banks. The transactions are no longer simple and they are no longer exclusive to
banks. Nowadays other types of financial institutions are actively involved and include
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Mugasha continues:
The syndication arrangement offers several economic benefits to
the lead bank, agent, and participants. Its very existence
enormously increases the capacity of the banks to accommodate
their borrowers' needs. For example, a bank may not have the
capacity to make a loan it wishes to make because of the sheer size
of the required loan. It may still be able to lend part of the loan,
however, if it forms a syndicate of lenders. For the participant, the
invitation to join in a syndicated loan gives it the opportunity to
lend funds that would otherwise be idle. 92
One form of an international syndicated loan is called a eurocurrency syndication.
Eurocurrency loans are made by a syndicate of banks. The lead
manager deals with the borrower and other participants about the
terms. It elicits the participation of other banks and may assume an
underwriting risk, i.e., commit to lend a fixed amount whether or
not other participants can be obtained. Other managing banks may
share responsibilities with the lead manager. They may have
regional responsibilities in a large international loan. 'Participants'
are simply the banks that provide funds. The agent bank deals with
the ongoing administration of the loan, communicating between the
borrower and the participants. It coordinates the disbursements to
the borrower, the calculation of interest due, and the distribution of
the payments from the borrower to the participants. 93
In addition to the development of the syndicated loan, sophisticated lenders injected
even more liquidity into the international capital markets by developing a secondary
market for syndicated loans.
Secondary loan market practices are those where the original
syndicate member passes to another party an interest in its loan, or
engages in any subsequent transaction in relation to the loan
interest. Through this market, the syndicate member/lender or
investor is able to sell the whole or part of a loan to other lenders or
investors, or may engage in other transactions in relation to the
collateralized loan obligations (CLOs), hedge funds, pension funds, and insurance
companies to mention but a few.
Id. at 6 (footnote omitted).
921d at 88.
93 SCOTT, supra note 89, at 599.
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same loan. Any lender or investor is also able to buy or acquire
interests in other loans to supplement its existing portfolio. The
traders, investors, and lenders who acquire interests in the
secondary market provide capital, thereby performing an important
function of adding liquidity in the overall loan market. The
continuous development of this market means that trading or other
dealing in syndicated loans is now a common feature of the
financial markets. Borrowers have increasingly accepted that their
loans will be assigned or transferred, and increasingly the loans are
acquired as investments by institutional investors and a vast array
of financial institutions.9 4
Given this explosive growth in international loan activity, proponents of the
Legislative Guide should ask: How has this been accomplished in the absence of
harmonized or uniform laws? If the absence of harmonization or unification is such
a barrier to international lending, how have bankers been able to overcome this
obstacle?
An examination of actual banking practice demonstrates that the use of loan
mechanisms such as syndicated loans has addressed and solved the due diligence
problem created by differing national laws. 95 The problem sought to be addressed
by the Legislative Guide is that differing national laws discourage lenders from
making cross-border loans because of the transaction costs and difficulties created
by inconsistent and conflicting laws.96 Syndications solve this problem by virtue of
the fact that the lead bank takes on the responsibility of determining how to comply
with the laws governing creation and perfection of the security interest, and the
other banks that participate in the loan rely on the lead bank's work. 97 There is no
need for all the banks to work out the security interest issues.
94 MUGASHA, supra note 87, at 36.
The secondary loan market has existed since the 1980's (even though not necessarily
under that label), and has evolved from occasional transactions negotiated and sold on
an ad hoc basis to commoditized transactions sold on the basis of standard documents.
Id.
95 See Yener Altunbas et al., Large Debt Financing Syndicated Loans Versus Corporate Bonds 7
(European Central Bank, Working Paper No. 1028, 2009), available at
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwpl028.pdf (highlighting bank process of delegating screening and
monitoring of syndicates to agent banks which, in turn, become specialized in specific geographical areas,
making harmonization of differing national laws unnecessary).
96 See, e.g., Sandeep Gopalan, The Creation of International Commercial Law: Sovereignty Felled?, 5
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 267, 279-80 (2004) (discussing how differences in contract laws of European Union
Member States imposes additional transaction costs, thereby deterring international deals).
97 See MUGASHA, supra note 87, at 43 ("The typical participation agreement leans heavily in favor of lead
bank control of the underlying loan.").
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The participants may have widely varying powers in relation to the
underlying loan. On the one hand, they may have very limited
powers right from inception whereby they may not have the
information or the means to verify the information supplied by the
lead bank. This situation may subsist for the entire duration of the
participation relationship in which the participants have very little
access to information regarding the borrower and no active role to
play in the underlying loan.98
Because of syndication, banks can therefore specialize in the due diligence
requirements of individual countries. Thus, one bank can develop an expertise in
the secured transactions law and due diligence requirements of (say) Poland, and
serve as the lead bank for a syndicated loan where the controlling law is the law of
Poland. This lead bank can then offer other banks around the world the opportunity
to participate in the loan, and the other banks may take advantage of the lead bank's
expertise in Polish law to make a loan to a Polish borrower, even though the other
banks may have no knowledge of Polish law. This phenomenon was noted in a
working paper issued by the European Central Bank.
For this reason, the logic of banks as designated monitors of
depositors . . . would also apply to the syndicated loan market,
where banks (or uninformed lenders) participating in the
syndication delegate most of the screening and monitoring to an
agent bank (or informed lender). . . . Therefore, certain lead banks
could obtain lending specialisation in specific sectors or
geographical areas and act as delegated monitors of participating
banks. 99
Instead of waiting for guidance from technocrats up high, it appears that banks have
resorted to the basic business concept of division of labor. Banks have successfully
created loan mechanisms that obviate the need for every bank to be an expert in
every national due diligence process. 00 The cost of due diligence associated with
complying with a particular national law regarding secured transactions is borne by
one bank, and others are able to participate in the loan by relying on the work of the
lead bank. These developments in international banking have emerged since the
Drobnig report from the 19 70's and have occurred without (or despite) the
assistance of efforts such as the Legislative Guide.101 So, what is the value-added
proposition of the Legislative Guide?
98 Id.
99 Altunbas et. al., supra note 95, at 7.
100 See, e.g., MUGASHA, supra note 87, at 2 (listing loan mechanisms such as syndicated loan, sub-
participation, loan participation, loan trading, credit derivatives, and collateralized debt obligations).
101 See id. at 36 (stating that secondary loan market has existed since 1980s and has continuously evolved
so that syndicated loans are now common in financial markets).
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CONCLUSION
By their own admission, the proponents of the Legislative Guide seek to
emulate the success of Article 9 and view the Legislative Guide as Article 9's global
equivalent.102 However, the starting points of their respective drafting were located
at polar opposites. Article 9 was drafted to incorporate and mirror actual,
commercial practices.1 03 The Legislative Guide was drafted with no obvious
reference to actual, commercial practices. For this reason, the Legislative Guide
lacks one of the crucial features of Article 9; it is unable to serve as a "how to"
guide on lender due diligence. In this regard, the Legislative Guide misses the mark
entirely on what lenders need in order to lend across borders. Lenders do not need a
technocratic Legislative Guide in order to make loans. Lenders need reasonable
certainty that their loans will be repaid. Reasonable certainty is provided by due
diligence. Instead of relying on organizations such as UNCITRAL to spur lending
activity, lenders (as one would predict) have relied on their own ingenuity to solve
the due diligence problems, and they have done so through means such as
international syndicated loans.104
In sum, the Legislative Guide is not the global equivalent of Article 9. Article 9
addresses and provides solutions to the lenders' due diligence concerns. It is
uncertain what the Legislative Guide would accomplish, especially in light of the
fact that the markets have provided their own solution to the problems created by
differing national laws. Thus, this paper concludes with one final question: What
does the Legislative Guide provide that the international capital markets have not
already accomplished?
102 See Macdonald, supra note 11, at 641 (noting Legislative Guide's working group mostly adopted basic
principles of modernization represented by Article 9).
103 See Everett, supra note 33, at 51 (explaining Article 9's draftsmen and codifiers adopted functional
approach which tapped into business community's expectations and vernacular).
104 See MUGASHA, supra note 87, at 3 (remarking that in last decade, major syndicated loan market
participants themselves have been developing common terminology, standard practices, and documents that
are increasingly being used by industry leaders).
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